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September 2014: interest rate comment (Deutsch) for Hypoport AG. Hypoport, the Berlin SDAX firm where I have my office, is dominating corporate housing finance brokerage in Germany and the largest B2B broker (fee originators 2 banks/insurers) for retail housing finance in Europe.
Can only publish this now. Through May/June I dug into Depfa Bank plc's historic fate from German taxpayer perspective (Deutsch) for a private sector client, after the German MoF finally decided to wind the bank down rather than selling it. It turns out that in October 2011 Germany wasted another EUR 2 billion by not restructuring / resolving the bank and haircutting hybrids and subordinated debt in the process under the new Irish Special Resolution Regime. This innovative resolution regime had been spearheaded aptly by an Irish government frustrated by high bailout cost. The German finance minister apparently was not frustrated then as much, and simply applied the same bad bank bailouts agreed on for the Landesbanken (left/right pocked for public investors) under Para 6 Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz to federal bad banks exchanging assets with private banks under Para 8 of the same law. The Commission almost went mad over the deal, but here in Germany very few seem to care.
NBP workshop Recent
trends in the real estate market and its analysis, 2013 Papers
submitted for publication are now published in the Narodowy Bank Polski
Working Paper Series and will be indexed on IDEAS REPEC and SSRN.
August 2014 Contribution of a chapter to The Global Financial Crisis and Housing on Transatlantic Mortgage Boom and Bust. The book has been carefully edited by Susan Wachter, Man Cho and Moon Joong Tcha. Korean Development Institution Series in Policy and Development, Edward Elgar.
July 2014 Short comment (in German) on the decision to make ESM funds retroactively available for bank recapitalization in 'individual cases'. Clearly, the motive is to compensate Ireland for the rude disruption of the country's sovereignty in October 2010, when a coalition of politicians from countries with large investors in Anglo Irish Bank senior unsecured debt forced the Irish sovereign to absorb their losses. Is there no better way to solve this de-facto bilateral issue than to change the rules of the ESM and open the ESM up for abuses in other cases? See also the 8 banks 8 countries bank restructuring study covering Anglo Irish Bank.
July 2014 Publication of a Finpolconsult study on mortgage prepayment indemnities in Europe (Vorfaelligkeitsentschaedigungen in Europa) as a follow-up on the implementation challenges of the EU CARRP Directive. The study has a broader discussion of the mortgage product menu and its stability implications as well as German mortgage market issues (in German, Anschreiben). German speakers might be interested in the survey on prepayment indemnities in Germany undertaken by the vzbv consumer group, of course always bearing in mind that it is a lobby group pushing its case (just like the banks). Die Welt has press coverage of my study and a piece produced by IW on the subject. For english studies and material on the subject and European mortgage finance in general see the housing finance page on this website.
I get lots of media requests on performance and restructuring issues of Austrian banks, in particular Hypo Alpe Adria (where the Austrian government found a legal lever to void the Carinthian state guarantees for subordinated debt issued by the bank) and the large Austrian banks Erste Bank and Raiffeisen with their significant CEE exposure. See also my work for EBRD on the CEE mortgage sector, which has been a major generator of problems for Western banks. In an economically and politically fragmented region we need more concertation of investment and lending strategies between public and private banks.
March/April 2014: presentations on creditor participation in European bank restructuring at Bruegel Institute (Finance Breakfast), upon invitation of Nicolas Veron, and CDU Wirtschafsrat, Bundesfachkommission Banken. PPTs as per below entries.
March 2014: publication of a study on Central/Eastern European mortgage and covered bond markets (Realkredit- und Pfandbriefmaerkte in Mittel- und Osteuropa) financed in 2012 by a German covered bond software provider (German). The study benefited from the earlier EBRD study available for download below. Covers also commercial real estate markets and additional countries.
February 2014: brief e-mail comment on the misinterpretations of the German bad bank experience that prevail at the Austrian central bank, re the hefty dispute with the Austrian finance ministry on the method of unwinding the Carinthian Landesbank Hypo Alpe Adria (in German). Or should I say the dispute is between Raiffeisen Bank International and Erste Bank?
February 2014 Paper for the National Bank of Poland on mortgage finance regulation issues in transition countries, summarizes my 2012 EBRD study.
January 2014: Presentation given at DG Competition of the European Commission on creditor participation in European bank restructurings. Slight changes vs. the IFO (and December 2013 Cyprus Price Waterhouse conference) versions, e.g. additional material on Slovenia. Presenting at DG COMP on this subject means of course carrying owls to Athens, so I probably learned more from them than they from me.
December 2013: interview with Gold Magazine on the background of the Cyprus creditor bail-in decisions taken in March 2013. I spent a couple of days on the island and came to conclude that the shortcuts taken in March during the purchase and assumption operations (transfer of Greek operations of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus to Piraeus Bank, transfer of Laiki good assets to Bank of Cyprus) and regarding the transfer of legacy ECB debt ('dark matter', which ominously made it from Laiki in Greece to Bank of Cyprus in Cyprus) have produced serious distortions of the outcomes for bank creditors.
I can only hope that with the de-facto establishment of a European FDIC in the form of the SRM, a move that I asked for in the studies of spring and summer below, this degree of operational deficits will become a thing of the past.
November 2013: presentation given at IFO Institute in Munich on Nov 11 ('Muenchener Seminare') on bank creditor participation in Europe.
October 2013: Study launch "Eight Case Studies on Current Bank Restructurings in Europe", a companion piece to the July 2013 financed by the Center for Financial Studies at the University of Frankfurt (Prof. Jan-Pieter Krahnen). The study widens the country angle from 3 (Greece, Spain, Cyprus) to 8 (in addition Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland) and looks into some of the spectacular cases of this crisis, e.g. Anglo Irish and Dexia. For those of you who are curious why your local bank bailout has become so expensive, learn about at the strangely protective behavior of our governments to even junior bond investors in so many cases and ask yourself how serious Europe will really be in changing her deep bailout policies.
Our press release highlights that it is essentially the small jurisdictions, first and foremost the Netherlands and Denmark, who have adopted clear strategies to increase creditor participation. Ireland was kept from acting. In European bank restructuring policy, small is truly beautiful. I see good reason to demand that European bank supervision and resolution authorities should be headed by representatives from smaller countries, those that have proven that they can do it and are committed to do it.
August 2013: Comment in Handelsblatt on the lack of creditor participation in the Greek bank restructuring program, which has driven up fiscal cost for Greece and increased the risk of future additional sovereign bond haircuts (Deutsch). Back on the envelope I estimate that holders of junior bonds in the four big Greek banks (all distributed via the Channel Islands) will be handed out cash at the tune of EUR 2 billion from the Greek sovereign. Note that once the government is invested in shares with large amounts, as in the Greek case, junior bond holders may lean back and wait for par cash payment. And in the case of dated subordinated securities they will receive coupon payments on top.
Addendum to the July 2013 study publication: In February and March 2013 I was retained by a political party in Bundestag to assess various Cyprus bank restructuring options. A paper was finished in April, available in German language here. It is a precursor exercise to the June/July study covering also Greece and Spain.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: pls visit the new blog of my mentor and friend Klaus Engelen, Banking Union Watch. Klaus is the top senior financial journalist of Germany, a long-term contributor to Handelsblatt and co-editor of The International Economy and the Global Risk Regulator. I cannot fathom how much I owe him for his insights and making contacts within the international public finance community.
July 2013: Study on Creditor Participation in Eurozone Bank Restructurings. This effort has been sponsored by the Green Party in Bundestag and European Parliament. A companion piece is financed by the Center of Financial Studies in Frankfurt and will appear shortly. Neither myself nor certainly the CFS have political party affiliations. But it is good to see that there is interest in such exercises in our parliaments, which have to vote on multi-billion Euro support programs. Yet, high political barriers towards transparency in Europe over banking program cost and their incidence still have to be overcome. So this can only be the starting point of more in-depth empirical reviews.
Some media response: article in der Standard and Sueddeutsche Zeitung on the occasion of the publication of the study (German), and a post in FTs Alphaville blog.
Here is also a presentation that I gave at the Peterson Institute and the IMF's Crisis Management Department on the empirical substance of the bank restructuring study in early June. We had a good time esp over at the IMF.
June 2013: those of you who are interested in Spanish mortgage finance and the subsequent banking crisis may be interested in my ad-hoc presentation given at this years International Housing Finance Course at the Wharton School. I will try to do a more in-depth study on the Spanish crisis, the problem as usual is politics pre-empting access to public funding.
Update October 2013: to the Olivier Blanchard's of this world who demand higher inflation rates and decide to ignore their credit implications. Restructuring can't be avoided for another reason: real debt reduction through inflation only works in a predominantly long-term fixed rate capital market environment. This was the case when the world entered the high-inflation phase of the 1970s. Today, the most vulnerable consumer, corporate and sovereign balance sheets are funded by variable rate lending, with the United States who still enjoy a global borrowing privilege probably being the only exception of relevance. This means that borrowing cost will jump immediately, as investors will try to avoid being taxed through inflation. Where Blanchard therefore ends is not an implicit, but an explicit expropriation strategy as in order to make his proposal work he needs to hold short-term rates low as well. This is realized in corners, e.g. in consumer finance (example refinancing of Euribor loans through the ECB in Spain), but would be rather an innovation for sovereign finance.
October 2012: EBRD-funded study on Mortgage Regulation in Central and Eastern Europe with an empirical focus on Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Serbia. Here is the presentation held at a seminar in Budapest mid-October.
November 2012: EBRD asked me to contribute to their 2012 Transition Report. Box 3.6 page 56-57. My key message is that diverging mortgage banking standards and availabilities of rental housing for young and low-income households create hard to overcome obstacle for Banking Union in Europe in the sense of full mutualization. One key free rider problem would be the invitation to simply keep selling variable-rate loans backed by ECB funding to keep pressing these groups into 'private' housing markets. This ignores the imperative to build or maintain social housing stock in a world with increasing income disparities and rising house price to income ratios in the centers of migration.
FEATURED: my colleague Sebastian Schich of OECD has once again hit home on the subject of implicit guarantees for banking arising not just from too-big-to-fail systemic risk threat but also from the currently seen practices of bank resolution.
Economist quote on the risk of banking crisis amidsts Germany's emerging house price bubble. I have argued elsewhere that German housing market fundamentals are strong, but financial conditions have softened now so much - primarily due to 'Euro angst' as my old colleague at empirica, Rainer Braun, says correctly - that low implied yields become a serious stability risk in some prominent housing market corners. And let's not be fooled by stagnant prices elsewhere: where the turnover is, there is the risk. If this goes on, holding the bag could be once again taxpayers who implicitly guarantee our retail banks that so far - and this in the motherland of Pfandbriefe - refuse to issue long-term bonds to secure low financing cost that could match those low yields. And unfortunately, the Basle III 'Net Stable Funding Ratio' concept is supporting this risk amnesia by assuming that most deposits will roll without repricing risk. Good sleeps over there at the BIS..
October 2012: Why does Germany not take the Polish example and limit mortgage loan maturities to 25 years to stem her house price boom? Ad-hoc commentary (in German). This could be an important precautionary measure, even as German housing lending so far doesn't show much signs of a boom.
Comment regarding Why Germany rejected using direct bank recapitalization for Spanish banks (mostly ex-Cajas). I suggest that the German decision to claw back the results of the June eurozone summit come October must be seen in the context of information constraints over the Spanish banking system, of the way Germany's own bank resolution efforts were handled (lavish subsidies even for junior bond investors), and of the inconconsistency of direct recapitalization with the overall eurozone protection approach in banking and sovereign finance focusing on catastrophic risk protection.
Here is the preceding comment of June 2012 in Handelsblatt focusing on the (politically understandable) attempts of the Spanish government to minimize bail-in at former Cajas facing considerable losses at the expense of European taxpayers. Here is the original longer version, journalists tend to heavily cut back. I argued that direct bank recapitalizations through the ESM/Eurozone would have directly substituted esp. junior bond capital that Spanish regulators allowed to walk out of the door in the months and years prior to the de-facto insolvency of many banks/Cajas in 2012. Most of you have never heard the name of Liberbank, a Spanish Caja merger result, a bank that essentially on Eurozone summit day in late June 2012 proposed to their hybrid capital owners a swap into 5 year deposits (i.e. several ranks upwards) without any haircuts. I demanded in reaction to this situation in Handelsblatt to proceed with Christian Barnier's bail-in proposals, scheduled for 2018, for immediate implementation and for the Spanish sovereign to remain liable to losses vis-a-vis the ESM.
June 2012: Short Zerohedge post on some of the issues facing investors regarding the construction of the Spanish covered bond law. See also my earlier paper on the German Pfandbrief system (in Deutsch).
Presentation given at IMFs MCM Department on Housing Finance Specialists - Reform or Unwind, as we are faced with dozens of dysfunctional housing finance systems in the overdeveloped world.
April 2012: Short article looking into German house price risk, potential mortgage default drivers and their joint financial determinants, written on behalf of Genopace (B2B platform). There are obviously mitigants, such as Germany's high rental sector share. Problematic however is the impact of low rates on house prices, and in combination with long-term fixing of those rates the high duration gap taken by German banks and accepted by bank regulators (Deutsch).
FT Alphaville post on below paper highlighting the challenge for central banks, courtesy Tracy Alloway.